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ABSTRACT 
This Article aims to fill a gap in the literature through a 
conceptual analysis of Boko Haram’s global nature and utilizing that 
analysis to evaluate current counter-terrorism measures against the 
group.  Central to this analysis will be the question of whether the 
group can be categorized as a global jihadist group.  Global jihadism 
is understood in this Article as a pan-Islamist movement against 
Western interests.  This Article argues that status as a global jihadist 
organization and hierarchy within the world’s global jihadist 
movement are best evaluated on a three-criteria approach using the 
indicators of conforming ideology, militant operations/targets, and 
external relations or cooperation.  It will be further argued that these 
criteria are important not only to provide a more comprehensive 
way of thinking of international terrorism but also in creating 
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effective countermeasures to the Boko Haram threat.  Using this 
methodology, this Article argues that because of Boko Haram’s less 
violent origins, its tepid connection to larger global jihadist 
entrepreneurial groups, and its situational leader-centric 
operational priorities, Boko Haram presents fertile potential to 
arrive at relatively non-violent solutions to the conflict in Northern 
Nigeria.  Moreover, Nigeria’s counter-terrorism approach, which is 
primarily military-based, and marred by corruption and massive 
human rights abuses, is unlikely to succeed due to a lack of proper 
conceptualization of Boko Haram’s evolution and its current status.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Originally founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram 
set out to impose strict Islamic law in Nigeria.1  Famously known for 
its abduction of 276 school girls in 2014 from Chibok,2 and later 110 
schoolgirls from Dapchi in 2018,3 the group has been designated as 
a terrorist organization by the U.S. State Department.4  Consistent 
with its mandate, the group has operated primarily in Nigeria.5  
 
 
 1 Yvonne Ndege, The Rise of Nigeria’s Boko Haram, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 30, 2013), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/09/201397155225146644.html 
[http://perma.cc/C2CV-Q65D]; see also ALEX THURSTON, ‘THE DISEASE IS UNBELIEF’: 
BOKO HARAM’S RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL WORLDVIEW 9-10 (The Brookings Project on 
U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Analysis Paper No. 22, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Brookings-Analysis
-Paper_Alex-Thurston_Final_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/26N6-ZEBP] (tracing the 
ideological roots and agendas of Boko Haram from 2002 to present). 
 2 Nina Strochlic, Six Years Ago, Boko Haram Kidnapped 276 schoolgirls. Where Are 
They Now?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 2020), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2020/03/six-years-ago-boko-
haram-kidnapped-276-schoolgirls-where-are-they-now/ 
[https://perma.cc/G8ME-B32Y]; Aminu Abubakar, As Many as 200 Girls Abducted 
by Boko Haram, Nigerian Officials Say, CNN (Apr. 16, 2014), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2014/04/15/world/africa/nigeria-girls-abducted/inde
x.html [https://perma.cc/4ST6-N5BF]. 
 3 Felix Onuah, Nigeria Says 110 Girls Unaccounted for After Boko Haram Attack, 
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2018, 11:41 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-
security/nigeria-says-110-girls-unaccounted-for-after-boko-haram-attack-idUSKC
N1G90Q3 [https://perma.cc/7F6C-X9R2]; see also Usman A. Tar & Samuel B. 
Ayegba, The Ecology of Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: Environmental Security in 
Northeastern Nigeria, in NEW ARCHITECTURE OF REGIONAL SECURITY IN AFRICA: 
PERSPECTIVES ON COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN THE LAKE CHAD 
BASIN 241, 251 (Usman A. Tar & Bashir Bala eds., Lexington Books 2020) (discussing 
Boko Haram’s kidnappings in Chibok and Dapchi). 
 4  Glenn Kessler, Boko Haram: Inside the State Department Debate over the 
‘Terrorist’ Label, WASH. POST (May 19, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2014/05/19/boko-h
aram-inside-the-state-department-debate-over-the-terrorist-label/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z6K6-TZT7]. 
 5 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
TERRORISM 2013, at 9 (2014), https://2009-
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However, despite its nationalist agenda, Boko Haram has 
maintained ties with internationalist jihadist groups, and in 2015 
pledged its allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.6  
Understanding the implications of Boko Haram’s ties to 
organizations and actors outside of Nigeria offers a better 
understanding of the group and its role in the international jihadist 
movement, and as a result, this understanding is crucial to 
anticipating Boko Haram’s actions. 
Scholars have attempted to understand the Boko Haram 
insurgency in Northern Nigeria through its membership, tactics, 
targets, and agenda.  In these studies, it is evident that Boko Haram 
began as a locally-oriented Islamic group with less violent 
tendencies, but rose to prominence through its imitation of the 
Taliban, leading to the nickname, the Nigerian Taliban. 7   They 
would later launch attacks against police and government 
installations,8  and transform into one of the most lethal terrorist 
groups, with the capability to launch large-scale attacks and 
kidnappings.9  Whereas the group existed to promote an Islamist 
agenda and resentment of Western civilization, as its name 
suggests,10  its current form is not clearly defined.  This research 
focuses on the group’s transformation over time, with evidence of 
more sophisticated tactics and transnational spread.  In the same 
 
 
2017.state.gov/documents/organization/225886.pdf [http://perma.cc/YJ8Y-
FEEZ] (stating that while the “group focuses principally on local Nigerian issues 
and actors,” it has reportedly carried out some terrorist activities in Chad, Niger, 
and Cameroon). 
 6 Adam Chandler, The Islamic State of Boko Haram? The Terrorist Group Has 
Pledged Its Allegiance to ISIS. But What Does That Really Mean?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 
2015), https://theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/03/boko-haram-
pledges-allegiance-islamic-state/387235/ [https://perma.cc/6WF4-NRQZ]. 
 7 Freedom C. Onuoha, The Audacity of the Boko Haram: Background Analysis and 
Emerging Trend, 25 SEC. J. 134, 134-35, 138 (2012). 
 8 See ANDREW WALKER, U.S. INST. OF PEACE: SPECIAL REPORT: WHAT IS BOKO 
HARAM? 3-6 (2012). 
 9 See id. at 4-6. 
 10 Who, What, Why: Exactly What Does The Phrase Boko Haram Mean?, BBC NEWS 
(May 13, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-27390954 
[https://perma.cc/4DQG-WG2P]. 
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vein, the analysis will be useful in scrutinizing Nigeria’s counter-
terrorism efforts and critiquing the compatibility of these efforts 
with the kind of threat posed by Boko Haram. 
Despite considerable scholarship on the activities of Boko 
Haram, there is a paucity of research investigating the group’s 
relationship with global Islamic terrorist groups, notably Al-Qaeda 
and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/Islamic State of Syria and 
Levant (ISIS/ISIL), and what these ties mean for the group’s status 
in global jihadism.  Existing literature has focused on understanding 
the group’s transformation over the years in the manner in which it 
has carried out attacks and its targets to find a correlation between 
the group’s activities and other global jihadi movements, 
specifically Al-Qaeda and ISIS. 11   Other accounts have tried to 
decipher the origins of the group by linking it with domestic 
political developments in Nigeria, especially in the northern region 
where the group originated.12  These studies provide very useful 
perspectives on its growth and various dynamics of understanding 
the evolution of this group.  Existing research, however, lacks 
methodological scrutiny in evaluating the global nature of Boko 
Haram.  By relying on mere characteristics without a well-defined 
conceptual framework, the existing assumptions of Boko Haram’s 
 
 
 11  See, e.g., Jacob Zenn, Demystifying Al-Qaida in Nigeria: Cases from Boko 
Haram’s Founding, Launch of Jihad and Suicide Bombings, 11 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 173 
(2017) (finding early and continued relationship between Al-Qaeda and Boko 
Haram); DAVID COOK, JAMES A. BAKER III INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y OF RICE UNIV., BOKO 
HARAM: A PROGNOSIS (Dec. 16, 2011), 
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/Research/535dcd14/REL-pub-Coo
kBokoHaram-121611.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL28-ED8T] (identifying Boko Haram 
as one of the jihadi groups based on an analysis of their activities); Suranjan 
Weeraratne, Theorizing the Expansion of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, 29 
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 610 (2017) (identifying Boko Haram’s ties to Al Qaeda); 
Caroline Varin & Dauda Abubakar, From Sectarianism to Terrorism in Northern 
Nigeria: A Closer Look at Boko Haram, in VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS IN AFRICA 
(Caroline Varin & Dauda Abubakar eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2017) (drawing 
comparisons between Boko Haram’s and ISIS’s militant Islamic reform goals). 
 12  See Adam Higazi, Brandon Kendhammer, Kyari Mohammed, Marc-
Antoine Pérouse de Montclos & Alex Thurston, A Response to Jacob Zenn on Boko 
Haram and Al-Qa’ida, 12 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 203, 205-06 (2018) (noting the 
importance of local political factors in understanding the insurgence of Boko 
Haram). 
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global nature are not properly articulated and therefore lack proper 
foundation and context.  This conceptualization is also important in 
creating the right counterterrorism strategy.13  It is also necessary to 
understand Boko Haram’s global status due to an increased focus 
on tackling global jihadi movements.14  
This Article aims to fill the gap in the literature through a 
conceptual analysis of Boko Haram’s global nature and to utilize 
that analysis to evaluate current counter-terrorism measures against 
the group.  This Article argues that status as a global jihadist 
organization and hierarchy within the world’s global jihadist 
movement is best evaluated on a three-criteria approach including 
the indicators of conforming ideology, militant operations/targets, 
and external relations or cooperation.  It will be further argued that 
these typologies are distinctly important not only to provide a more 
comprehensive way of thinking of international terrorism but also 
in fashioning proposed solutions to the Boko Haram situation.  
Using this methodology, this Article argues that because of the 
group’s less violent antecedent historical development, and because 
of its tepid connection to larger global jihadist entrepreneurial 
groups, and because of its situational leader-centric operational 
priorities, Boko Haram presents fertile potential to arrive at 
relatively non-violent solutions to the conflict in Northern Nigeria.  
Moreover, Nigeria’s counter-terrorism approach, which is primarily 
military-based and marred by corruption and massive human rights 
abuses, 15  is unlikely to succeed due to a lack of a proper 
conceptualization of Boko Haram’s evolution and its current status. 
This Article will first review the literature in the field concerning 
conceptualizations of the global jihadist frameworks and the place 
 
 
 13  For understanding the significance of contextualising terrorism before 
analysing counterterrorism mechanisms see Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One 
Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?, 3 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 287 (2002). 
 14 See Jennifer Varriale Carson & Matthew Suppenbach, The Global Jihadist 
Movement: The Most Lethal Ideology?, 22 HOMICIDE STUD. 8, 8-9 (2018). 
 15 See generally Victor Chidubem Iwuoha, United States’ Security Governance in 
Nigeria: Implications on Counterterrorism Strategies Against Boko Haram, 54 J. ASIAN & 
AFR. STUD. 1175 (2019) (discussing the state of corruption and human rights abuses 
by the security and defense sectors in Nigeria). 
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of the Boko Haram group in that framework.  It will then analyze 
those conceptualizations to develop fresh insights on the status and 
potential of this group in the greater global context.  Building upon 
these insights, it will thereafter discuss protocols for countering 
Boko Haram and the feasibility of adopting a causal model. 
II. GLOBAL JIHADISM:  A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Modern global jihadism was arguably formed by three geo-
political conflicts:  the Israel-Palestine conflict, generally,16 the 1979 
Soviet war in Afghanistan,17 and the 1990 stationing of American 
troops in Saudi Arabia in the buildup to the Gulf War in Iraq.18  
These incidents created a pan-Islamic movement that sought to 
battle with the ‘far enemy’ in addition to the ‘near enemy,’ as jihad 
was traditionally understood. 19   This mobilization grew to other 
territories that had Muslim populations, advocating for a rise 
against the U.S., the West, and Israel, all of which were considered 
an existential threat to the Islamic world.20  This was a change in 
strategy for Islamist groups that were previously focused on local 
grievances21 like the self-determination struggles in Palestine and 
 
 
 16 See Meir Litvak, The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israel Conflict: The Case of 
Hamas, 34 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 148, 149-150 (1998).  
 17  DANIEL BYMAN, AL QAEDA, THE ISLAMIC STATE, AND THE GLOBAL JIHADIST 
MOVEMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 3 (2015). 
 18  ROBIN WRIGHT ET Al, THE JIHADI THREAT: ISIS, AL QAEDA, AND BEYOND 8 
(2016/2017), https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/12/jihadi-threat-isis-al-
qaeda-and-beyond [https://perma.cc/6JTT-BR9F]. 
 19 Mark D. Kielsgard & Tam Hey Juan Julian, The Second Front—Again? The 
Rising Tide of Global Jihadism in East and Southeast Asia, 13 INTERCULTURAL HUM.  RTS. 
L. REV. 131, 137-38, 148 (2018). 
 20 See THURSTON, supra note 1, at 9. 
 21 Some commentators have rejected the categorization of all Islamic extremist 
groups as part of global jihad, arguing that this decontextualization of conflicts only 
serves the political interests of the groups as well as of those battling them.  See, e.g., 
Caitriona Dowd & Clionadh Raleigh, The Myth of Global Islamic Terrorism and Local 
Conflict in Mali and the Sahel, 112 AFR. AFFS. 498, 508-09 (2013). 
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Chechnya. 22   The call to global jihadism was aligned with local 
grievances through attribution of said grievances to the hegemonic 
power of the United States, which had led to wars and allegedly 
illegal occupations in majority-Muslim countries.23  Global jihadism 
therefore became chiefly associated with Al-Qaeda and its founder, 
Osama bin Laden, whose base was Afghanistan but which gradually 
spread to many parts of the world. 24   Whereas Afghanistan 
remained the organizational base of the group, many other extremist 
groups who subscribed to the ideology were spread around the 
world with direct and indirect links to Al-Qaeda.25  A number of 
foreign fighters frequently traveled to Afghanistan for training 
where Al-Qaeda had set up camps.26 
The war in Afghanistan following 9/11 led to a significant 
dismantling of the organizational structure of Al-Qaeda and the 
weakening of global jihadism,27 but this empowered new frontiers 
of global jihadism. 28   In fact, though this movement suffered 
setbacks at the leadership level, its operational strategy shifted focus 
to the greater autonomy of terrorist cells 29  and, significantly, to 
similar ideologically-inspired groups in different parts of the world 
 
 
 22 Thomas Hegghammer, Global Jihadism After the Iraq War, 60 MIDDLE E.J. 11, 
13 (2006). 
 23 Id. 
 24  See James W. Messerschmidt, Osama Bin Laden and His Jihadist Global 
Hegemonic Masculinity, 32 GENDER & SOC’Y 663, 663-66 (2018) (discussing the 
increasing global interest in Osama bin Laden’s jihadist messages).  
 25 See id. 
 26  DCI COUNTERTERRORIST CTR., CENT. INTEL. AGENCY, CTC-01-40004, 
AFGHANISTAN: AN INCUBATOR FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 3-4 
(2001), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/369161-2001-03-27-afghani
stan-an-incubator-for.html [https://perma.cc/KB8Y-GZX2]; see also, Daveed 
Gartenstein-Ross & Nathaniel Barr, How Al-Qaeda Works: The Jihadist Group’s 
Evolving Organizational Design, HUDSON INST. (June 1, 2018), 
https://www.hudson.org/research/14365-how-al-qaeda-works-the-jihadist-grou
p-s-evolving-organizational-design [https://perma.cc/8XR4-PQRR]. 
 27  Bill Braniff & Assaf Moghadam, Towards Global Jihadism: Al-Qaeda’s 
Strategic, Ideological and Structural Adaptations Since 9/11, 5 PERSPS. ON TERRORISM 36, 
36 (2011). 
 28 See id. at 36-37. 
 29 BYMAN, supra note 17, at 145. 
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that were previously unaffiliated or loosely affiliated with Al-
Qaeda.30  As noted in 2010 by the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Al-Qaeda “has transformed into a diffuse global network 
and philosophical movement composed of dispersed nodes with 
varying degrees of independence.”31 
Some of these groups have networked in their different regions 
under the umbrella of Al-Qaeda or created affiliations with Al-
Qaeda.  Such groups are reportedly active in North Africa, Yemen, 
East Africa, and Southeast Asia. 32   Several other non-affiliated 
groups have emerged over time that have followed the global 
jihadist ideology and operations. 33   Although these groups are 
driven by diverse local agendas, they find commonality in religious 
ideology and opposition to the United States and the West.  This 
kind of association has been called the “Al Qaeda effect.”34  This 
effect becomes apparent when locally oriented Islamist groups 
reinterpret their grievances through a global perspective, putting 
the West at the center of their targets.35  Kielsgard and Tam have 
described such groups as “second fronts” within the context of 
global jihadism. 36   They describe second fronts as ”internal 
insurrection by non-state parties within [their respective] territories 
 
 
 30 Gartenstein-Ross & Barr, supra note 26. 
 31 MAJORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELS., 111TH CONG., AL QAEDA IN 
YEMEN AND SOMALIA: A TICKING TIME BOMB 5 (Comm. Print 2010), 
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Yemen.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T5WX-GCMG]. 
 32 See, e.g., IS ‘Caliphate’ Defeated but Jihadist Group Remains a Threat, BBC NEWS 
(Mar. 23, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-45547595 
[https://perma.cc/WC6Y-PPDH]. 
 33 ANGEL RABASA ET AL., BEYOND AL-QAEDA: PART 2, THE OUTER RINGS OF THE 
TERRORIST UNIVERSE 1-2 (2006). 
 34  See Zhang Lijun, Anti-Terrorism Alliance, BEIJING REV. (2004), reprinted in 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON AL QAEDA 153, 155 (April Isaacs ed., 2006). 
 35 Braniff & Moghadam, supra note 27, at 43; see also Hakeem Onapajo, Ufo 
Okeke Uzodike & Ayo Whetho, Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: The International 
Dimension, 19 S. AFR. J. INT’L AFFS. 337, 338 (2012) (describing the Western role in 
local grievances as “cultural imperialism and [the waging of] unjust wars in Muslim 
countries”). 
 36 Kielsgard & Julian, supra note 19, at 145. 
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in common cause to weaken the common enemy.”37  The common 
enemy in this case is the United States and other Western countries 
who are allied with Israel.38 
One question arises as to how otherwise disparate groups with 
imperfectly aligned agendas and territorial interests, inter alia, fit 
within the global jihadist movements.  This research takes the cue 
from studies on Al-Qaeda, an organization which has sought to 
promote a global jihadist agenda and has inspired similar like-
minded groups in addition to its own affiliates globally.39  In that 
regard, this Article has identified a three-criteria analysis to evaluate 
whether a particular group can be regarded as part of the global 
jihadi movement, and if so, to assess the vitality of the links between 
the organization and the larger movement.  These three key 
indicators of a global jihadist organization are subscription to 
ideology (including doctrine and goals), militant operations and 
targets, and external relations. 
Concerning the first criterion, the ideological basis of global 
jihadist movements is founded on the Salafi sect whose followers 
subscribe to “a strict literalist interpretation of the texts of the Quran 
and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad.  They privilege armed 
struggle (jihad) as a means for implementing their austere, 
intolerant, and muscular vision of Islam.”40  Salafi jihadists believe 
in taking up arms against the enemy, who in this context is the U.S.-
West axis that, according to them, has caused immense suffering of 
Muslims in the countries where it has waged war or occupied 
 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. at 139, 146 (describing a strategy of global jihadism that involves internal 
uprisings by non-state parties within other territories to “weaken the common 
enemy”). 
 39 Braniff & Moghadam, supra note 27, at 36-37. 
 40 Bernard Haykel, Professor of Near Eastern Stud., Princeton Univ., Inside 
the Mind of ISIS: Understanding Its Goals and Ideology to Better Protect the 
Homeland, Statement Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental 
Affs., 114th Cong. (Jan. 20, 2016), 
https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Haykel-2016-01-20.
pdf [https://perma.cc/7JNU-B68L].  
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territories.41  However, pursuit of a similar ideology alone does not 
necessarily mean that jihadist groups will find a common cause.  In 
fact, differences amongst such groups are common.  For instance, 
well known global jihadi movements like ISIS on the one hand, and 
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates on the other, have often openly disagreed 
on goals, tactics and even targets 42 —but both are rooted in the 
Salafist ideology.43  Therefore, in this analysis, the focus will be the 
degree to which Boko Haram has strictly manifested this ideology. 
In regard to operations and targets, the second criterion, global 
jihadi groups are often defined by their targeting of Western and 
perceived Western interests in their operations.  Furthermore, in 
these operations, the groups exhibit a level of sophistication in 
launching attacks, indicative of well-funded and high-level 
coordinated training—a quality that would also relate to the third 
criterion.  This is evidence of the groups’ potential to reach beyond 
local targets to transnational and global targets. 
The third criterion focuses on understanding the group’s 
linkages with transnational and global groups outside its usual base 
of operation.  This aspect is closely tied not only to ideological 
congruence between extremist groups, but also to aims, tactics, and 
targets.  As groups align themselves with an Islamist ideology that 
 
 
 41  ROBERT G. RABIL, SALAFISM IN LEBANON: FROM APOLITICISM TO 
TRANSNATIONAL JIHADISM 12 (2014). 
 42 See Bernard Haykel, ISIS and Al-Qaeda—What Are They Thinking? 
Understanding the Adversary, 668 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 71, 75-79 (2016) 
(describing the conflicts between Al-Qaeda and ISIS, which rose from their 
disagreement on “ideological, tactical, and strategic matters”). 
 43 See Daniel L. Byman, Divisions Within the Global Jihad: A Primer, BROOKINGS 
(Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/10/02/divisions-
within-the-global-jihad-a-primer/ [https://perma.cc/5GHC-D3JF] (discussing the 
difference between ISIS and Al-Qaeda in their approach to carrying out the Salafi 
ideology); see also MICHAEL R. KELVINGTON, INT’L INST. FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, 
GLOBAL SALAFI-JIHADISM IDEOLOGY: THE “SOFT POWER” OF THE ENEMY 1 (Int’l Inst. for 
Counter-Terrorism 2019), https://www.ict.org.il/images/Global%20Salafi-
Jihadism-Enemy%20Soft%20Power.pdf [https://perma.cc/22PC-73WQ] (”While 
both seek the establishment of a global Islamic caliphate, their vision for the 
caliphate and the means through which it is realized vary.”). 
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calls for the violent confrontation against a common enemy, these 
groups engage at a certain level as associates or affiliates in the 
global jihad.  It is from these links that groups share in trainings, 
tactics, and intelligence, and financially support each other.  
Moreover, the strength of the linkages of the localized affiliate with 
the broader global jihadi movement, provides insight into the 
possibility of peaceful resolution to grievances of the local affiliate.  
This would enable the policymakers to understand the extent of the 
threat faced and how to resolve it as further discussed below.  
III. BOKO HARAM IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBAL JIHADISM 
a. Ideology and Goals 
In assessing the ideology of an organization, analysis must go 
beyond the organization’s publicly advanced goals—which can be 
disingenuous and tend to be temporary, shifting with leadership 
changes.  Instead, the group’s origins and development should be 
carefully reviewed to determine the group’s foundational ideology, 
as well as to track the intellectual transformations it has experienced.  
Boko Haram emerged in 2002 as Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunna 
Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad, translated from Arabic as “People 
Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad.”44  
The stated goal of the group was “supporting Islamic education and 
establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria.”45  The fundamental aim is 
the propagation of traditional Islam with a focus on Nigeria, 
especially the predominantly Muslim northern region of the 
country.  The group’s origins are deeply rooted in the politics of 
 
 
 44  Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions 
Committee Adds Boko Haram to Its Sanctions List, U.N. Press Release SC/11410 
(May 22, 2014), https://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11410.doc.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Q7RK-4PAZ]. 
 45 Id. 
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northern Nigeria,46 but Boko Haram metamorphosed into an entity 
with other opportunistic pursuits in the name of Islam.  Boko Haram 
has flirted with jihadism throughout the course of its history, 
especially since 2010.47   
An obvious advantage of adhering to the ideology of global 
jihadism, despite having a specific set of purely domestic goals, is 
that it allows Boko Haram to brand itself with wider values and aims 
to develop broader consensus in northern Nigeria, international 
support, and ideological prestige within the Muslim community.  
Whilst extremist groups like Boko Haram are perhaps better 
understood from the context in which they emerged and continue to 
operate,48 it is also the case that these groups propagate an Islamist 
ideology as a way of legitimizing themselves in the spaces in which 
they operate.  It is further the case that global organizations like Al-
Qaeda have managed to inspire locally based extremist groups to 
reframe their grievances through a global jihadist ideology.49  As 
argued by Kelvington:  “The Salafi-Jihadist ideology is the 
intangible ‘soft power’ of the adversary, which violently contests 
globalization and the international system, and fuels the continued 
expansion of the global jihadist movement through selective citation 
of Islamic texts, sensationally coercive methods of jihadist groups, 
and dissemination of ideas on the Internet.”50 
 
 
 46  See, e.g., Higazi, Kendhammer, Mohammed, Pérouse de Montclos & 
Thurston, supra note 12, at 205 (noting that the group’s initial rise is attributable to 
corruption in Nigeria). 
 47 See THURSTON, supra note 1, at 17-18 (describing a series of Boko Haram’s 
jihadist attacks following its re-emergence in 2010). 
 48  See Dowd & Raleigh, supra note 21, at 503-05 (arguing that domestic 
contexts and issues are crucial to understanding the motivations and dynamics of 
Islamist groups).  
 49 Braniff & Moghadam, supra note 27, at 41; see also WALKER, supra note 8, at 
3 (noting that locals were referring to Boko Haram as “Nigerian Taliban” when it 
emerged). 
 50 KELVINGTON, supra note 43, at 2. 
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Boko Haram benefits politically by associating itself with other 
global jihadi movements.51  By pursuing a global jihadist agenda 
simultaneously with a local agenda, Boko Haram has managed to 
appeal to religious identity politics in the predominantly Muslim 
north of Nigeria as it pursues other local interests.  The local political 
agenda has centered on the politics of dissociation from the Federal 
Government and the South, which is predominantly Christian.52  By 
infusing a Salafist jihadi ideology into its operations, Boko Haram 
reinterprets the local political interests through the prism of this 
ideology, which rejects Western influences it associates with the 
South and the Federal Government.53  The group frames its armed 
conflict against the Federal Government as justified in order to “oust 
non-Islamic influence from traditionally Muslim lands en route to 
establishing true Islamic governance in accordance with Sharia, or 
God’s law.”54   
On the other hand, global jihadist movements enjoy a mutually 
beneficial relationship with local groups like Boko Haram by 
propagandizing that national extremist groups are affiliates.  This 
serves to show the long arm of the global jihadist movement and 
project its significant global power and influence by taking credit for 
all activities perpetrated domestically by affiliates, in furtherance of 
 
 
 51  See SHOLA ABIDEMI OLABODE, DIGITAL ACTIVISM AND CYBERCONFLICTS IN 
NIGERIA: OCCUPY NIGERIA, BOKO HARAM AND MEND 179 (Athina Karatzogianni ed., 
2018). 
 52  Daniel Egiegba Agbiboa, No Retreat, No Surrender: Understanding the 
Religious Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria, 34 AFR. STUDY MONOGRAPHS 65, 67-68 
(2013) (describing how Nigerians often identify more strongly with regional 
religious groups than with political parties). 
 53 See Onapajo, Uzodike & Whetho, supra note 35, at 344-45 (discussing Boko 
Haram’s hatred for southern Nigeria because of their higher levels of 
Westernization). 
 54 JARRET M. BRACHMAN, GLOBAL JIHADISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 4 (2009).  A 
similar strategy is employed by the Somali based group, Al-Shabaab, who formed 
associations with the marginalized north-eastern sector of Kenya, which has shared 
ethnic and religious ties with Somalia and the coastal region.  See Why Is Al Shabab 
Making Inroads into Kenya?, TRT WORLD (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-is-al-shabab-making-inroads-into-ke
nya-24981 [https://perma.cc/DD29-63R8] (noting Al-Shabaab’s use of Islamic 
dogma in recruiting and radicalizing young Kenyans). 
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a global jihadist agenda, whether the global jihad played any role or 
not.  It is therefore more appropriate to analyze the association of 
these groups at different levels:  the pursuit of a domestic agenda 
which could be political or economic and the furtherance of a global 
Islamist agenda through domestic acts. 
Another benefit to aligning domestic terror groups with 
international jihadism, beyond simply marketing their groups' 
branding, is the logistical and financial benefits from associating 
with well-established global jihad movements.55  The benefits to the 
international jihadist movement beyond the pervasive 
dissemination of its ideology include dividing the perceived 
Western enemies and obtaining intelligence on the ground.  In effect, 
the group’s two contexts of existence, local and global, complement 
one another rather than conflict. 
However, some scholars have argued for differentiation 
between global and national goals when analyzing extremist 
groups.56  What is lost in this approach is that extremist groups have 
proven to be effective in pursuing both sets of goals in tandem.  This 
is made possible by the sharing of a base ideology among Islamic 
extremist groups which enables these groups to vacillate swiftly 
between a domestic agenda and a global one in their operations. 
In the case of Boko Haram, the group has been chiefly associated 
with politics in northern Nigeria, an area which is predominantly 
Muslim.  This group’s tactics and targets (discussed below) have, 
however, promoted a broader Islamist agenda which resonates well 
with other extremist groups.57 
The diffuse character or lack of clarity in Boko Haram’s 
ideological leanings and goals, however, can be attributed to the 
shifting priorities of its leadership, which have also resulted in 
several splinter groups dissociating themselves from the main 
 
 
 55 Zachary Abuza, Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network, 24 
CONTEMP. SE. ASIA 427, 428 (2002). 
 56 See, e.g., Dowd & Raleigh, supra note 21, at 503. 
 57 By mainly targeting Christians and adopting tactics that are well known to 
be employed by global jihadists like suicide bombings, the group has promoted the 
global jihadi agenda and shown potential to further it. 
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group.58  Immediate goals of the group have been set at the whim of 
successive leadership which is often defined by the prior affiliations 
with other extremist groups or immediate tactical and financial 
links.  For instance, during its first phase (2002-09), the group’s focus 
was driven by the philosophical ideals of Mohammed Yusuf who 
emphasized the rejection of Western education,59 and sought to copy 
the Taliban’s imposition of a strict Islamic lifestyle. 60   At its 
inception, the group was colloquially known as the ”Nigerian 
Taliban.”61  Boko Haram’s earlier activities were also associated with 
the charismatic demeanor of Mohammed Yusuf who was an 
admirer of Bin Laden, and was keen to establish an Islamic state in 
northern Nigeria, akin to what the Taliban had done in 
Afghanistan.62 
Following Yusuf’s death in 2009, Boko Haram’s perceived 
radical turn during the second phase (from 2010 onwards) was 
largely a result of the leadership shift under Shekau.  Shekau’s 
leadership has been defined by indiscriminately brutal tactics that 
are commonly perceived as contrary to even extreme Islamist 
ideology like kidnapping and keeping Muslim schoolgirls as 
 
 
 58  Boko Haram in Nigeria: Split Emerges over Leadership, BBC (July 16, 2018) 
[hereinafter Split Emerges over Leadership], https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-36973354 [https://perma.cc/AW8C-NKXM]. 
 59  In an interview with the BBC, Muhammad Yusuf is quoted as saying, 
”There are prominent Islamic preachers who have seen and understood that the 
present Western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our 
beliefs in Islam.”  Joe Boyle, Nigeria’s ‘Taliban’ Enigma, BBC (last updated July 31, 
2009, 8:13 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8172270.stm 
[https://perma.cc/S3YC-JZ3Y]. 
 60 See COOK, supra note 11, at 9. 
 61  See Boyle, supra note 59. But see id. at n.29 (noting that the Boko Harm 
Manifesto found online does not align with Yusuf’s approach and is most likely not 
a work of Yusuf).  
 62 Ryan Cummings, A Jihadi Takeover Bid in Nigeria? The Evolving Relationship 
Between Boko Haram and Al-Qa`ida, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. SENTINEL, Dec. 2017, 
at 24, 24, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/CTC-
Sentinel_Vol10Iss11-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC4B-D9NJ]. 
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slaves.63  Differences over tactics and targets have led to splits within 
the group.64   
Despite the marked difference in approaches during the two 
phases, the consistent unifying factor that continues to define the 
group is its Salafist jihadi base ideology.  The group has advocated 
for an Islamic state in Nigeria and rejected Western ideals of 
government since its inception.  Yet, the Salafist ideology does not 
in itself require a jihadist response to domestic problems or the 
targeting of Western or international targets.  It does not preclude 
the use of non-violent solutions except perhaps in its most radical 
iterations.  The Boko Haram under Yusuf called for adherence to 
strict Islamic teachings in northern Nigeria but did not seek to 
export it or engage in violent tactics.  Thus, the form of Salafism to 
which the group adheres was, and may eventually be again, 
temperate enough to take on a local non-violent form—perhaps 
through semi-autonomous political and economic power sharing 
with the federal government.   
b. Operations and Targets 
For a long time, Boko Haram’s operations and targets were 
localized.  Its attacks were on local political targets like prisons,65 but 
these subsequently escalated to churches, schools and other 
government installations.66  For that reason, most commentators had 
dismissed the group’s activities as a local insurgency without 
 
 
 63  See Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram’s Ultra-Extremist Side Resurfaces: From the 
Execution of Mamman Nur to Humanitarian Workers, 16 TERRORISM MONITOR, Oct. 19, 
2018, at 8, 8 (2018), https://jamestown.org/program/boko-harams-ultra-
extremist-side-resurfaces-from-the-execution-of-mamman-nur-to-humanitarian-w
orkers/ [https://perma.cc/D75C-3QAK]. 
 64 JONATHAN R. WHITE, TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY 166 (9th ed. 2017). 
 65  See ALEXANDER THURSTON, BOKO HARAM: THE HISTORY OF AN AFRICAN 
JIHADIST MOVEMENT 208 (2018). 
 66 See WHITE, supra note 64. 
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significant links to international jihadism.67  Initially, the group was 
not perceived as posing a threat to the United States and other 
Western intelligence communities or the interests of their allies.68 
The threat changed in 2011 when Boko Haram launched attacks 
on the Federal Police headquarters and the United Nations building 
in Abuja. 69   These attacks were different in character and 
significance from previous attacks.  It was the first time the group 
had employed suicide bombings, a relatively common tactic with 
global jihadi movements, indicating some form of association or 
tactical training with these well-established movements such as Al-
Qaeda.70  The trend of suicide bombings took a new direction in 2014 
when the group started deploying female suicide bombers. 71 
 
 
 67  See, e.g., Higazi, Kendhammer, Mohammed, Pérouse de Montclos & 
Thurston, supra note 12. 
 68 See S. COMM. ON COUNTERTERRORISM & INTEL. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., 
112TH CONG., BOKO HARAM: EMERGING THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND 1 (Comm. 
Print 2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-
112HPRT71725/pdf/CPRT-112HPRT71725.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NG5-V8X7; 
see also WALKER, supra note 8, at 3 (“In a 2004 U.S.  State Department cable, revealed 
by Wikileaks, the U.S. embassy in Abuja concluded the group did not present an 
international threat and likely had no links to international jihadist 
organizations.”). 
 69  Deadly Blast Hits UN Office in Nigeria, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 26, 2011), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/08/26/deadly-blast-hits-un-office-in-ni
geria/ [https://perma.cc/T2V9-Q66Y].  For more information on the attacks See 
HARVEY MATHIEU GUIDÈRE, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 79 
(2nd ed. 2017) and HARVEY J. SINDIMA, MAJOR ISSUES IN ISLAM: THE CHALLENGES 
WITHIN AND WITHOUT 119 (2018). 
 70 See Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram’s al-Qaeda Affiliation: A Response to ‘Five Myths 
about Boko Haram,’ LAWFARE (Feb. 1, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/boko-harams-al-qaeda-affiliation-response-five-
myths-about-boko-haram [https://perma.cc/7HQJ-AQN3] (explaining that the 
Boko Haram attacks on the Federal Police headquarters and the United Nations 
building were the first suicide bombings in Nigeria, and describing other similar 
suicide bombings committed by Al-Shabaab). 
 71 FREEDOM C. ONUOHA & TEMILOLA A. GEORGE, AL JAZEERA CTR. FOR STUD., 
BOKO HARAM'S USE OF FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBING IN NIGERIA 2 (Mar. 17, 2015), 
https://studies.aljazeera.net/sites/default/files/articles/reports/documents/20
153189319985734Boko-Harams-Female.pdf [https://perma.cc/74E6-UMXK]; see 
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However, it should be noted that the use of suicide bombing was 
certainly not a novel idea by 2011 and therefore not dispositive of 
any truly significant connection between Boko Haram and other 
international jihadist groups.  Second, the target of the attacks, 
which had been locally oriented, took a global turn when the group 
launched its attack on the United Nations. 72   However, some 
scholars argue that since the group has not launched any further 
attacks on international targets, the attack on the United Nations 
should be considered a one-off event perhaps intended to 
“embarrass the Nigerian government,” or as a means to reciprocate 
the support the group had received from other global jihadi 
movements.73 
Nevertheless, the attack on the United Nations in Abuja was a 
significant event for a group that had previously been thought of as 
a local militant group interested only in Nigeran politics.  
Contextually, these attacks came as the backdrop of what has come 
to be considered the beginning of the group’s second phase which 
was ushered in after the group retreated following the extra-judicial 
killing of its leader, Muhammad Yusuf in 2009.74  Upon reemerging 
in 2010, the group’s then temporary leader, Sani Umar, had made it 
clear that its targets were not restricted to within Nigeria.75  
 
 
also Macpherson U. Nnam, Mercy Chioma Arua & Mary Sorochi Otu, The Use of 
Women and Children in Suicide Bombing by the Boko Haram Terrorist Group in Nigeria, 
42 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 35, 35-36 (2018) (detailing the increased use by 
Boko Haram of women and children in terrorist attacks). 
 72 See SINDIMA, supra note 69. 
 73 WALKER, supra note 8, at 9. 
 74 See Omar Mahmoud, Local, Global, or in Between? Boko Haram’s Messaging, 
Strategy, Membership, and Support Networks, in BOKO HARAM BEYOND THE HEADLINES 
87, 88 (Jacob Zenn ed., 2018). 
 75 Ioannis Mantzikos, Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and Neighbouring Countries: 
A Chronology of Attacks, 8 PERSP. ON TERRORISM 63, no. 6 (2014), 
www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/391/html 
[https://perma.cc/VSN2-Q4R8]; see also Explaining Boko Haram, Nigeria's Islamist 
Insurgency, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/11/world/africa/boko-haram-in-nigeria.ht
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Further, dismissing the attack on the United Nations as a one-off 
event fails to appreciate its symbolic significance.  As noted in a 
study that analyzed various terrorist groups, “The percentages of 
attacks against foreigners . . . do not describe the entire situation.”76  
Indeed, such attacks, even in small numbers, indicate a potential for 
similar attacks when an opportunity presents itself.77  It is alleged 
that Boko Haram wanted to “send a message to the U.S. President” 
through the suicide bombing.78  Moreover, the significance of the 
United Nations attack should be seen according to the relatively 
high number of casualties (23 deaths).79  On the other hand, in the 
years since the attack, the Boko Haram group has failed to pursue a 
strategy of targeting international or Western targets, 80  giving 
further credence to the one-off theory.   
However, the two attacks led to increased international focus on 
Boko Haram’s activities through the significant media attention it 
received, 81  and subsequent interest within the intelligence 
community in the United States.82  The attacks were also important 
 
 
ml [https://perma.cc/XGL4-M66N]; Michael Nwankpa, Making Nigeria 
Ungovernable (2009-2012), in THE BOKO HARAM READER (Abdulbasit Kassim & 
Michael Nwankpa eds., 2018) (describing Boko Haram’s alleged role in the 2013 
kidnapping of a French family). 
 76  BONNIE CORDES, BRIAN M. JENKINS & KONRAD KELLEN, A CONCEPTUAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING TERRORIST GROUPS 49 (1985). 
 77 Cf. id. at 48-49 (discussing how, among terrorist organizations that target 
foreigners, many focus less than fifteen percent of their activity on these attacks). 
 78 Nigeria UN Bomb: Video of ‘Boko Haram Bomber’ Released, BBC (Sept. 18, 2011), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14964554 [https://perma.cc/X4BT-
EQGY]. 
 79 Id.  
 80 Heidi Schultz, Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Who Are They and What Do They Want?, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (May 8, 2014), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/5/140507-boko-haram-nigeri
a-borno-state-maiduguri-mohammed-yusuf-abubukar-shekau-goodluck-jonathan
-world/ [https://perma.cc/F3Q5-AKES]. 
 81  Ngozi Akinro, Covering the Boko Haram Crisis Beyond the Nation: 
Analysis of Shifting Time and Space Frames in News Reporting, 82 INT’L COMM. 
GAZETTE 189, 195 (2020).  
 82 Lauren Ploch Blanchard, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R43881, Nigeria’s 2015 Election 
and the Boko Haram Crisis 7 (2015), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=762116 
[https://perma.cc/YLB9-RM2Z]. 
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in not only understanding the evolution of the group through its 
tactical and technical capacity, but also the dangers it posed to 
foreign—especially Western and perceived Western targets.  It was 
indicative of a group that was taking a different trajectory and 
joining the ranks of other global jihadi movements.  As noted by a 
commentator, “the United Nations attack is much more in line with 
other [global terrorist] organizations, and is strongly reminiscent of 
the suicide attack in Baghdad against the United Nations in August 
2003, which was one of the opening blows of the Iraqi insurgency.”83  
The same sentiments were also expressed by General Carter Ham, 
former commander of the United States Africa Command 
(AFRICOM), who noted that the attack indicated the possibility of 
ties with other jihadist movements like Al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM) and Al-Shabaab.84 
Subsequent Boko Haram targets have been almost entirely local 
with the group having instead stepped up attacks on churches and 
schools.85   However, the group has continued the use of suicide 
bombers, further re-enforcing the perception that it has enhanced its 
tactical and technical capabilities—an indication of foreign technical 
and training assistance.86  As discussed below, the group’s use of 
 
 
 83 David Cook, The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, 4 COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. 
SENTINEL, Sept. 2011, at 3, 5, https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss2.pdf [https://perma.cc/9JZR-
G4PS]. 
 84 Abuja Attack: Car Bomb Hits Nigeria UN Building, BBC NEWS (Aug. 26, 2011), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14677957 [https://perma.cc/Y7J5-
LEPJ]. 
 85  See Michael Ibanga & James Archibong, The Boko Haram Insurgency: 
Characterisation and Implications Under Municipal and International Laws, in BOKO 
HARAM & INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 141 (John-Mark Iyi & Hennie Strydom eds., 
2018). 
 86  See, e.g., Ely Karmon, Boko Haram’s International Reach, 8 PERSP. ON 
TERRORISM 74, 75-76 (2014) (noting that Boko Haram’s suicide attacks were AQIM’s 
signature tactic, and the attack on the United Nations headquarters was comparable 
to AQIM’s attack on the United Nations offices in Algiers on December 11, 2007); 
see also Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram’s Fluctuating Affiliations: Future Prospects for 
Realignment with al-Qa`ida, in BOKO HARAM BEYOND THE HEADLINES 115, 124 (Jacob 
Zenn ed., 2018) (attributing the suicide bombing technical skills to possible training 
abroad with AQIM and Al-Shabaab). 
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suicide bombing to launch attacks—a technique that is linked to Al-
Qaeda and Al-Shabaab—suggests that Boko Haram may have 
received external technical and training assistance.87   Further, in 
2014, Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of an 
estimated 200 Chibok schoolgirls, triggering global alarm. 88  
Kidnapping is a technique associated with its splinter group, 
Ansaru, Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (The Supporters 
for the Aid of Muslims in Black Africa), which has carried out a 
number of kidnappings in Nigeria. 89   However, neither suicide 
bombing nor mass kidnapping techniques provide definitive 
evidence of Boko Haram’s ties to international jihadism as they are 
easily as likely to be copy-cat attacks.  It certainly provides little 
insight into the vitality of external linkages, ambitions, or goals—
particularly in light of how few international targets Boko Haram 
has attacked in recent years. 
Ansaru has been more forthright about the global dimension in 
its targeting with the group being associated with kidnappings of 
foreign nationals, as well as directing attacks against Nigerian 
security personnel. 90   Ansaru has claimed responsibility for the 
kidnapping and execution of seven foreign workers of a Lebanese 
 
 
 87  See, e.g., Katherine Zimmerman, From Somalia to Nigeria: Jihad, WKLY. 
STANDARD (June 18, 2011, 9:29 AM), reprinted in WASH. EXAM’R, 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/from-somalia-to-niger
ia-jihad [https://perma.cc/V64E-J67T].  Zimmerman quotes a written statement 
from Boko Haram that said, “Very soon, we will wage jihad . . . .  We want to make 
it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they 
received real training on warfare from our brethren who made that country 
ungovernable . . . .  This time round, our attacks will be fiercer and wider than they 
have been.”  Id.  
 88 See Abubakar, supra note 2.  
 89 Alexander Smith, Ansaru: Boko Haram Splinter Group Sows Terror in Nigeria, 
NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2016, 12:31 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/missing-nigeria-schoolgirls/ansaru-boko-
haram-splinter-group-sows-terror-nigeria-n551661 [https://perma.cc/TKF7-
WN68]. 
 90 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Al-Qaida Sanctions 
Committee Adds Abubakar Mohammed Shekau, Ansaru to Its Sanctions List, U.N. 
Press Release SC/11455 (June 26, 2014) [hereinafter U.N. Press Release]. 
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construction company 91  and launched an attack on a Nigerian 
military convoy that was set to join an Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) military campaign against Islamic 
militants in Mali. 92   The attack on the Nigerian military convoy 
resulted in the death of two peacekeepers and was orchestrated to 
express displeasure with Nigeria’s collaboration with France in 
Mali.93  Further, Ansaru’s employment of kidnapping as a technique 
has been linked to training with AQIM.94 
Significantly, Ansaru’s split from Boko Haram was precipitated 
by disputes over targets.  The splinter group’s self-declared leader 
at its formation, Abu Usamata Al’Ansari, criticized Boko Haram’s 
targeting of fellow Muslims in northern Nigeria rather than 
Christians and Western interests.95   Ansaru, therefore, set out to 
establish itself as a terrorist organization along the lines of Al-Qaeda 
with an objective of attacking international and foreign targets, 
something that sets it apart from Boko Haram.96 
Boko Haram sets a distinct footprint from its splinter groups and 
remains largely a group with a national agenda.  The one-off attack 
 
 
 91 Nigeria Islamists Ansaru claim Bauchi Setraco Seizures, BBC NEWS (Feb. 18, 
2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-21497044 
[https://perma.cc/6ENV-BEUQ]; Nigeria Islamists ‘Kill Foreign Hostages,’ 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 9, 2013), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/09/nigerian-islamists-kill-fore
ign-hostages [https://perma.cc/WYL8-2QAX]. 
 92  Isaac Abrak & Tim Cocks, Islamists Ansaru Claim Attack on Mali-Bound 
Nigeria Troops: Paper, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2013, 10:39 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence/islamists-ansaru-claim-att
ack-on-mali-bound-nigeria-troops-paper-idUSBRE90J0B520130120. 
 93 U.N. Press Release, supra note 90. 
 94 Zenn, supra note 86. 
 95  See Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, Boko Haram and Politics: From 
Insurgency to Terrorism, in 2 BOKO HARAM: ISLAMISM, POLITICS, SECURITY AND THE 
STATE IN NIGERIA 135, 140 (Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos ed., 2014); see also 
Boko Haram: Splinter Group, Ansaru Emerges, VANGUARD NEWS (Feb. 1, 2012, 5:06 
AM), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/boko-haram-splinter-group-
ansaru-emerges/ [https://perma.cc/C3R9-3Y96]. 
 96 Jacob Zenn, Cooperation of Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali 
Intervention, 6 COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. SENTINEL, March. 2013, 1, 1-2 (2013), 
https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss31.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CG2F-8QTM]. 
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on the United Nations building and the use of kidnapping and 
suicide bombing fail to make out a convincing case for notable 
changes to its core domestic ambitions.  More importantly, the 
selection of its targets—largely in Nigeria—serves practical rather 
than ideological goals.  The local-only targeting practices of Boko 
Haram reveal that it does not see itself as a significant part of the 
larger global jihad movement and suggest that local solutions would 
tend to be more effective. 
c. External Links 
Boko Haram’s alleged external linkages have largely been 
dictated by the whims of successive leadership and can be described 
as ad hoc at best.  There is “little evidence,” for instance, to suggest 
that at its founding Boko Haram had direct links with Al-Qaeda or 
its affiliates.97  Thus, it would be highly inaccurate to classify it as a 
mere extension or a cell.98  However, there is evidence that Boko 
Haram, through its leadership over time, trainings, and operations, 
has maintained various links with other foreign fighters and global 
jihadi movements that point towards an ideological congruence and 
coordinated efforts to wage jihad with these other groups.99 
The first indicative external ties with global jihadi movements 
developed in the early stages of the group when one of its leaders, 
Yusuf Ahmed, collaborated with a member of AQIM, Ibrahim 
Harun, for training of Boko Haram members in Niger. 100  
 
 
 97 JOHN CAMPBELL, NIGERIA: DANCING ON THE BRINK 139-40 (updated ed. 2013). 
 98 Cf. Zenn, supra note 11, at 174-76 (arguing that Boko Haram’s founding was 
linked to Al-Qaeda through funding and logistical support with an hypothesis that 
was based on alleged prior links of one of the founding leaders with Al-Qaeda but 
this is not sufficient to show how Al-Qaeda influenced Boko Haram’s creation more 
than merely motivating the group). 
 99 Daniel E. Agbiboa, Identity, Deprivation, Terror: Why Boko Haram Rebels, in 
UNDERSTANDING BOKO HARAM: TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN AFRICA 109, 120 
(James J. Hentz & Hussein Solomon eds., 2017). 
 100 See Zenn, supra note 11, at 174 (detailing Boko Haram’s collaboration with 
their affiliate groups, as well as Al-Shabaab, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and their affiliates). 
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Mohammed Yusuf, who was the leader of the group from 2002 until 
his death in 2010, allegedly obtained funding from Al-Qaeda of up 
to $3 million dollars,101 but there is no evidence that Boko Haram 
maintained any links with Al-Qaeda in terms of logistics, training, 
and choice of targets.  Moreover, $3 million dollars is a paltry sum 
in the context of a broad social movement.  Instead, during 
Muhammad Yusuf’s leadership in the first phase, the group was 
largely focused on local politics in Nigeria.102 
Subsequently, Boko Haram has at different times declared its 
allegiance to other global jihadi movements. 103   These shifting 
allegiances are determined mainly by the existing leadership of the 
group.  In 2009, Sani Umar who briefly assumed the group’s 
leadership declared that, “Boko Haram is just a version of the Al 
Qaeda which we align with and respect.  We support Osama bin 
Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country 
is totally Islamized which is according to the wish of Allah.”104  After 
the death of Muhammad Yusuf in 2010, his deputy, Abubakar 
Shekau took over leadership and immediately declared his intention 
to associate with Al-Qaeda.105  This was after Abdelmalik Droukdel, 
the leader of AQIM, had publicly offered assistance to Boko 
 
 
 101 Terrence McCoy, This is How Boko Haram Funds Its Evil, WASH. POST (June 
6, 2014, 3:29 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2014/06/06/this-is-how-boko-haram-funds-its-evil/ 
[https://perma.cc/AQM6-TPM2]. 
 102 See AKBAR AHMED, THE THISTLE AND THE DRONE: HOW AMERICA’S WAR ON 
TERROR BECAME A GLOBAL WAR ON TRIBAL ISLAM 129 (2013). 
 103 Robert Crowley & Henry Wilkinson, Boko Haram: A New Threat in West 
Africa, in WEST AFRICAN STUDIES CONFLICT OVER RESOURCES AND TERRORISM: TWO 
FACETS OF INSECURITY 99, 105 (Marie Trémolières ed., 2013). 
 104 COOK, supra note 11, at 14. 
 105 Jacob Zenn, Nigerian Al-Qaedaism, 16 CURRENT TRENDS ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY 
99, 108 (2014). 
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Haram. 106   AQIM allegedly trained personnel and financially 
assisted Boko Haram following this announcement in 2010.107 
Further, in 2011, Shekau directly sought Al-Qaeda’s technical 
and financial support.108  Despite indicating that he supported the 
Al-Qaeda cause, and the existence of evidence to show that the 
group became more lethal in its attacks and tactics—demonstrating 
possible assistance from outside—there is no evidence Shekau was 
otherwise able to establish proper links with Al-Qaeda.109  Instead, 
in 2015, Shekau pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the 
leader of ISIS/ISIL.110  This declaration of allegiance was accepted 
by ISIS/ISIL and precipitated Boko Haram’s change of name from 
Jama`at Ahl al-Sunna li- Da`wa wa-l-Jihad, to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi 
Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiya, meaning, Islamic State’s West Africa Province 
(ISWAP)111—although this later became a separate splinter group 
which dissociated itself from the Shekau-led Boko Haram.112  These 
seeming ad hoc affiliations provide evidence of only half-hearted 
allegiance of Boko Haram to global jihadi movements.  In nearly 
every instance when a collaboration was announced it did not 
include significant joint operations, was only as robust a connection 
as the current leadership willed, lacked continuity, and often led to 
Boko Haram splintering into sub-groups.  Boko Haram also failed to 
initiate significant regional attacks outside of Nigeria, which would 
have advanced the global jihadi enterprise as truly global in scope. 
 
 
 106 THURSTON, supra note 65, at 165.  In a letter to Boko Haram, Droukdel is 
quoted as writing, “We are ready to train your men . . . in how to deal with weapons, 
and to help you however we can, whether with men, weapons, supplies, or 
equipment, to enable you to defend our people in Nigeria.”  Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Cummings, supra note 62, at 25.  
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 24. 
       111 John Bugnacki, What’s in a Name?: Boko Haram Renames Itself the Islamic 
State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP), AM. SEC. PROJECT (May 12, 2015), 
https://www.americansecurityproject.org/whats-in-a-name-boko-haram-rename
s-itself-the-islamic-states-west-africa-province-iswap/[https://perma.cc/FUE6-
3QTU]. 
 112 Zenn, supra note 86, at 115-17. 
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The exact nature of the ties between Boko Haram and global 
jihadist organizations is complex because of the various splinter 
groups.  However, the mainstream group stepped away from its 
association with Al-Qaeda in 2015 when it claimed allegiance with 
ISIS.113  Its association with ISIS deteriorated to the extent that in 
August 2016 ISIS unilaterally announced new leadership for Boko 
Haram switching from Shekau to Abu Musab al-Barnawi,114 which 
failed to materialize, but did occasion another split in the Boko 
Haram group.115  Weak external ties also is evidenced by the poor 
state of Boko Haram’s finances, which points to very limited 
financial assistance from either Al-Qaeda or ISIS or its affiliates.116 
Another potential indication of external links with other jihadist 
movements is transnational presence.  It has been argued that a lack 
of a transnational presence should necessarily be seen as a factor that 
militates against existence of a coordinated global agenda.117  Most 
local extremist groups start out primarily engaged in an agenda that 
is focused on their locality, the near enemy.  However, extremist 
groups will eventually push a political, religious, or economic 
agenda within the regions where they exist, or even beyond, often 
borrowing inspiration, tactics, and ideology from other violent 
extremist groups.118   Boko Haram seems to take a different path 
pursuing a less robust regional agenda—though even this is 
transient depending on the leadership in place at any given time, 
internal organizational struggles, and external relations with other 
extremist groups. 
 
 
 113  COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT, BOKO HARAM 2, 
https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/boko-haram 
[https://perma.cc/CTP3-2G2X] (last visited Sept. 22, 2020). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 4. 
 116 Id.  
 117 Dowd & Raleigh, supra note 21, at 504. 
 118 See generally EKATERINA STEPANOVA, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RSCH. INST., 
TERRORISM IN ASYMMETRICAL CONFLICT: IDEOLOGICAL AND STRUCTURAL ASPECTS 
(2008) (arguing that violent Islamist movements can only be effectively challenged 
through nationalist movements). 
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Even though initially started as a localized group, Boko Haram 
and its splinter, Ansaru, have engaged in some initiatives with 
transnational and global presence.  Boko Haram operates from 
within the Nigerian borders but also from the region of Lake Chad 
where it has established camps.119  However, the presence in the 
Lake Chad region is out of convenience as the region provides a safe 
haven for the group which has been largely driven out of its initial 
base of Yobe and Borno States through Nigeria’s counter-insurgency 
efforts.120  Even though Boko Haram’s primary operating theater is 
within Nigeria (mostly in the north), the group has engaged in 
limited attacks in neighboring countries such as the Cameroon 
attack (on a police station in Kousseri) in 2014,121 the Niger attack 
(on Niamey prison) in 2013,122 and more recently in the Chad attack 
(on an army base at Dangdala) in 2019. 123   These attacks have 
however been associated with freeing fellow militants (Cameroon & 
Chad)124 or to smuggle weapons (Niger)125 and have little bearing on 
the advancement of the global jihadi agenda and are rightly 
considered isolated exceptions.  The ability to launch transnational 
 
 
 119 See INT’L CRISIS GRP., FIGHTING BOKO HARAM IN CHAD: BEYOND MILITARY 
MEASURES (Mar. 8, 2017), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/246-fighting-
boko-haram-in-chad-beyond-military-measures.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3DX-
L3ER]; see also Chronology of Events, SEC. COUNCIL REP., 
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/chronology/lake-chad-basin.php  
[https://perma.cc/77WS-EKCD] (revised May 4, 2020). 
 120 See Nigerian Troops Repel Boko Haram Insurgents in Yobe State, SAHARA REPS. 
(Apr. 21, 2020), http://saharareporters.com/2020/04/21/nigerian-troops-repel-
boko-haram-insurgents-yobe-state [https://perma.cc/V4AY-ERQX]. 
 121 Cameroon-Chad Border Crossing Closed After Attack, WORLD BULL. (May 6, 
2014 2:22 PM) [hereinafter Cameroon-Chad Border Crossing], 
https://www.worldbulletin.net/africa/cameroon-chad-border-crossing-closed-
after-attack-h135613.html [https://perma.cc/5LGG-RTGS]. 
 122 Niamey Prison Break: Niger Confirms 22 Escaped, BBC NEWS (June 2, 2013) 
[hereinafter Niamey Prison Break], https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
22749230 [https://perma.cc/Q62Q-G2VL]. 
 123 Boko Haram Militants Kill 23 Soldiers in Chad, DW NEWS (Mar. 22, 2019), 
https://www.dw.com/en/boko-haram-militants-kill-23-soldiers-in-chad/a-48025
225 [https://perma.cc/UT8X-78VH]. 
 124 Cameroon-Chad Border Crossing, supra note 121. 
 125 Niamey Prison Break, supra note 122. 
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attacks, however, does speak to the group’s capabilities and 
sophistication over time.  Ansaru, on the other hand, has associated 
itself with AQIM and adopts a more internationalist agenda.126 
In the same vein, there have been reports of Nigerian fighters 
fighting alongside AQIM in Mali, 127  but evidence that these are 
associated with Boko Haram has been anecdotal.128  It is possible 
that some of these fighters could have had a previous association 
with the group but owing to Boko Haram’s allegiance to ISIL, they 
are most likely affiliated with Ansaru, if they have any affiliation at 
all. 
Closer to home, Boko Haram has had what may be seen as an 
‘internal-external’ collaboration with Ansaru which is borne out of 
necessity as they battle their common enemy, the Nigerian Army.129  
Particularly, this cooperation is key to Ansaru’s survival after 
suffering military setbacks from the Nigerian Army onslaught that 
largely drove it out of northeast Nigeria.130  It is alleged that since 
 
 
 126  Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram’s International Connections, 6 COMBATING 
TERRORISM CTR. SENTINEL, Jan. 2013, at 7, 12 (2013), https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/CTCSentinel-Vol6Iss1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM78-
JYW3]. 
 127 See Zenn, supra note 11, at 182. 
 128  See COUNTER EXTREMISM PROJECT, AL-QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB 
(AQIM) 24, 
https://www.counterextremism.com/sites/default/files/threat_pdf/Al-Qaeda%
20in%20the%20Islamic%20Maghreb%20%28AQIM%29-10232020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TQ3H-67WW]. 
 129 Boko Haram and Ansaru may differ on tactics but they have common 
interests that bind them together.  As noted by Zenn: 
Ansaru and Boko Haram still revere Boko Haram founder Muhammad 
Yusuf, and their members may move fluidly between groups and form 
partnerships to target mutual enemies: the Nigerian government, France 
and the West.  They may also collaborate on refining their tactics as well 
as expanding their areas of operations to locate new targets and eliminate 
Western and Christian influence from Nigeria and the region. 
Zenn, supra note 96, at 8. 
 130 See Alexis Akwagyiram, Nigerian Army Says It Arrests Leader of Islamist 
Militant Group Ansaru, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2016, 4:45 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-violence/nigerian-army-says-it-arre
sts-leader-of-islamist-militant-group-ansaru-idUSKCN0X10NK. 
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2013 the two groups have been intermittently working together but 
without official cooperation, though the intelligence on this is 
sketchy.131   Boko Haram has acknowledged this collaboration by 
confirming that the two groups worked together in the kidnapping 
of French priest Father Georges Vandenbeusch in northern 
Cameroon in 2013. 132   Even then, Ansaru continues to express 
disdain for Shekau’s leadership signaling no likelihood that they can 
work together beyond a few collaborations.133  In some cases though, 
these ad hoc collaborations have contributed to enhancing Boko 
Haram’s technical and tactical capacity.134 
Boko Haram’s external linkages with international jihadist 
groups and its own splinter groups can be characterized as 
uncommitted associations of convenience.  There has been little 
sharing of intelligence, aid, financial support, logistical support, and 
 
 
 131  See John Campbell, Are Nigeria’s Boko Haram and Ansaru Getting Back 
Together?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Nov. 20, 2013), 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/are-nigerias-boko-haram-and-ansaru-getting-back-tog
ether [https://perma.cc/5PRP-255N]. 
 132 See French Priest ‘Kidnapped’ by Nigeria’s Boko Haram in Cameroon, WORLD 
WATCH MONITOR (Nov. 19, 2013), 
https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2013/11/french-priest-kidnapped-by-nig
erias-boko-haram-in-cameroon/ [https://perma.cc/C6RH-VAFN] (quoting an 
anonymous source as saying, “I can confirm that the French priest is in the hands 
of Mujahideen [fighters] from Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad [Boko 
Haram’s Arabic name], who carried out the operation that was co-ordinated with 
Ansaru”); see also Experts Puzzled by French Priest Kidnap Claim, RFI (Nov. 16, 2013, 
10:24 AM), http://en.rfi.fr/africa/20131116-experts-puzzled-french-cameroon-
priest-kidnap-claim [https://perma.cc/G4YU-AT5G] (stating that analysts were 
confused by claims of cooperation between Boko Haram and Ansaru). 
 133 See Jacob Zenn, Leadership Analysis of Boko Haram and Ansaru in Nigeria, 7 
COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. SENTINEL, Feb. 2014, at 23, 25-26 (2014), 
https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/CTCSentinel-Vol7Iss2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5CXM-23YT]. 
 134 Zenn identifies four areas that Boko Haram would have benefitted from 
collaborating with its splinter groups: kidnapping, suicide bombing, raids on 
military barracks, and media narratives.  See Zenn, supra note 86, at 125-26 
(describing how collaboration between Boko Haram and splinter groups benefitted 
Boko Haram’s operations). 
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few joint operations.135  Boko Haram has had shifting alliances with 
Al-Qaeda or ISIS and its own splinter groups.  Moreover, the weight 
of the evidence shows that international jihadist organizations have 
little influence on either Boko Haram’s leadership or its members, as 
any embryonic bonds have been broken by Boko Haram’s targeting 
of fellow Muslims 136  and ISIS’s failed attempt to install new 
leadership in the group and depose Shekau.137  Also, Boko Haram’s 
linkages with its own splinter groups are similarly ill-defined.  
IV. COUNTERING THE BOKO HARAM THREAT 
Nigeria’s counterterrorism measures have been multifaceted but 
with a primary focus on military crackdown.  The government has 
employed what can be considered as hard and soft responses to the 
insurgency.  The hard measures involving military and law 
enforcement. 138   The soft measures have focused on de-
 
 
 135  Freedom C. Onuoha, Danger Not to Nigeria Alone: Boko Haram's 
Transnational Reach and Regional Responses, FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG PEACE AND 
SEC. SERIES NO. 17, Nov. 2014, at 1, 6-7, http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/bueros/nigeria/11066.pdf [https://perma.cc/RFU2-K4PH]. 
 136 See John Campbell, Suspected Leadership Changes to IS-Backed Boko Haram 
Faction Continue, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/suspected-leadership-changes-backed-boko-haram-fa
ction-continue [https://perma.cc/WGA9-EDSU]. 
 137 See Jacob Zenn, Boko Haram Faction Releases Book on History and Ideology, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/blog/boko-haram-
faction-releases-book-history-and-ideology [https://perma.cc/23GY-JM63]; see 
also Split Emerges Over Leadership, supra note 58 (describing the conflict over control 
of Boko Haram between Abubakar Shekau and Abu Musab al-Barnawi). 
 138 See Kingsley Omonobi, Ben Agande & Ndahi Marama, Military Bombards 
Terrorists’ Camps, VANGUARD (May 17, 2013, 7:04 AM), 
https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/05/military-bombards-terrorists-camps 
[https://perma.cc/96WA-FUFJ] (discussing the deployment of troops to regions in 
Nigeria under a state of emergency); see also Ola’ Audu, Nigerian Military to Continue 
Sambisa Forest Operation After Killing Over 20 Boko Haram Suspects in Raid, PREMIUM 
TIMES (May 17, 2013), https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/134770-
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radicalization and community policing.139  Progress has arguably 
been made in reducing the threat posed by the insurgents,140 but the 
measures employed so far have proved insufficient in the long term.  
The counterterrorism measures need to be addressed against the 
backdrop of the above conceptual analysis of Boko Haram in order 
to proffer insightful prospects for dealing with the insurgency. 
a. Military Approach 
The Nigerian government’s main response to Boko Haram’s 
violent extremism has been a military crackdown that has raised 
concerns of rights violations141 and effectiveness in the long-term.142  
Military and law enforcement response as a way of combating 
violent extremism have been an easy choice for many countries 
facing such problems. 143   Governments often resort to labelling 
insurgents as terrorists in order to delegitimize them and open a 
way to apply the “hard tactics” for countering them.  Nigeria has 
justified its military approach to counter-insurgency by linking Boko 
 
 
nigerian-military-to-continue-sambisa-forest-operation-after-killing-over-20-boko-
haram-suspects-in-raid.html [https://perma.cc/88H4-MKVC] (noting the success 
of a Nigerian military operation against Boko Haram); Akinola Olojo, Boko Haram 
Exposes the Cracks in Nigeria’s Military Strategy, INST. FOR SEC. STUD. (Oct. 2, 2018), 
https://issafrica.org/iss-today/boko-haram-exposes-the-cracks-in-nigerias-milita
ry-strategy (discussing how Boko Haram has caused the Nigerian military to re-
evaluate its tactics and intelligence). 
 139  Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos, ‘The Only Good Jihadist is a Dead 
Jihadist’: Boko Haram and De-Radicalization Around Lake Chad, 29 SMALL WARS & 
INSURGENCIES 863, 874-77 (2018). 
 140 Id. 
 141 See Nigeria: Military Holding Children as Boko Haram Suspects, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH (Sept. 10, 2019, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/10/nigeria-military-holding-children-bok
o-haram-suspects [https://perma.cc/R7PJ-SHS4]. 
 142 See Habibu Yaya Bappah, Nigeria’s Military Failure Against the Boko Haram 
Insurgency, 25 AFRICAN SEC. REV. 146, 151-55 (2016). 
 143  See Mark D. Kielsgard & Tam Hey Juan Julian, Autocatalytic Models of 
Counter-Terrorism in East and Southern Asia: An International Comparative Analysis of 
China, Indonesia, and Thailand, 50  GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 461, 467-70 (2018). 
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Haram with global jihadist movements like Al-Qaeda.  Through this 
linkage, Nigeria has attempted to globalize the problem rather than 
deal with it as a matter of domestic politics.144 
Nigeria is not entirely wrong to associate the Boko Haram 
insurgency with global jihadism as shown from the on-again, off-
again linkages it has exhibited, along with its splinter groups.  Boko 
Haram has increasingly grown to exhibit characteristics of global 
jihadism and, significantly, it has the potential of sustaining global 
jihad through its entrenched ideology, evolved tactics and potential 
external links with other extremist groups.  However, this potential 
is overstated, and labelling has potentially served to further isolate 
the group from mainstream government negotiations and polarized 
the community in northern Nigeria.  It has also provided no barrier 
to Boko Haram to establish affiliations with other terrorist groups 
with an Islamist agenda (rather the reverse), though to date the 
linkages are rather haphazard 145  or haven’t meaningfully 
materialized. 
Nigeria’s first coordinated response to the insurgency in 
northeast Nigeria was in July 2009 following a traffic altercation 
between the sect members and traffic police over a failure to wear 
motorcycle helmets.146  The escalation of violence between the group 
members and police prompted the federal government to unleash a 
brutal joint military and police crackdown through an operation 
dubbed “Operation Flush” which led to the killing of almost 1000 
sect members without due process.147  Thereafter, more troops were 
deployed following a declaration of a state of emergency by 
President Goodluck Jonathan in 2012, 2013, and 2014 in parts of 
Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe.148 
 
 
 144 See Dowd & Raleigh, supra note 21, at 504. 
 145 See Zenn, supra note 126, at 7-12.    
 146  Hilary Matfess, Boko Haram: History and Context, OXFORD RESEARCH 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AFRICAN HISTORY 7 (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.
0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-119?print=pdf [https://perma.cc/YRL5-PWYT]. 
 147 Id. 
 148 See Onuoha, supra note 135, at 4-5.   
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The military offensive had mixed results.  The Nigerian 
government managed to ultimately drive the group from the 
majority of its territory and neutralized its ability to wage 
conventional warfare.149  Nationally, Nigeria might have succeeded 
in temporarily removing the problem from within its borders but 
this pushed the group to attack from neighboring countries like 
Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, which shows the lack of a sustainable 
solution and, under one perspective, internationalizes the conflict.150  
Additionally, this has led to a change of strategy for Boko Haram, 
which has resorted to other soft targets through kidnapping, suicide 
bombings, and sexual violence,151 instead of a conventional internal 
armed conflict. 
Despite the claimed successes of the military strategy by the 
Nigerian government,152 a solitary strategy that avoided addressing 
the underlying political issues that gave impetus to the rise of the 
insurgency was doomed to failure in the long run.  “Both military 
 
 
 149  See Nigerian Army Captures Last Boko Haram Camp in Former Stronghold, 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 24, 2016, 8:36 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/24/nigerian-army-captures-las
t-boko-haram-camp-in-sambisa-forest [https://perma.cc/X6FG-JKZS]. 
 150  See HUSSEIN SOLOMON, TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM IN AFRICA: 
FIGHTING INSURGENCY FROM AL SHABAAB, ANSAR DINE AND BOKO HARAM 11 (Stuart 
Croft ed., 2015). 
 151 See id. at 10 (arguing that groups facing military repression are more likely 
to resort to more lethal tactics once they have lost military ground, using the  
examples of Al-Shabaab’s mall attack in Nairobi despite suffering military setbacks 
in Somalia at the hands of African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces, and the 
Islamic militants suicide bombings in Mali in September 2013 despite the military 
successes of a French-led offensive); see also Emma Bauer & Meghan Conroy, Boko 
Haram: Nigerian Military Crackdown Prompts Terror Group to Adapt, 14 TERRORISM 
MONITOR, Apr. 15, 2016, at 1, 7, https://jamestown.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Terrorism_Monitor_-_Volume_XIV__Issue_8_01.pdf?x
68464 [https://perma.cc/ZS6R-3F3Z (stating that Boko Haram has focused on 
“wanton violence” against women and children rather than capturing land). 
 152 Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari, has claimed that the military 
strategy has been successful in driving out the militants from their base and 
neutralized their ability to launch “conventional attacks.” Nigeria Boko Haram: 
Militants ‘technically defeated’ – Buhari, BBC NEWS (Dec. 24, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618 [https://perma.cc/GN9R-
NBCR]. 
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and law enforcement are reactive models principally designed to 
deter and react to terrorist acts as they occur but are seldom 
concerned with rooting out and addressing the fundamental causes 
of extremism . . . .”153  Indeed, concerns about the effectiveness of the 
military strategy have been raised by experts on the ground who 
have argued that the resurgence of Boko Haram attacks demonstrate 
a need for a change of strategy.154 
In addition to its lack of effectiveness, Nigeria’s military 
approach to counterterrorism may be seen as falling short by 
exacerbating the problem.155  Unfair and overly harsh military and 
law enforcement strategies in counterterrorism are bound to be 
counterproductive by alienating the affected communities and 
leading to more radicalization.156  One of the key events that spurred 
the growth of Boko Haram in its most lethal period from 2010 
onwards was the violent repression of the sect in 2009 that 
culminated in the extrajudicial killing of its leader Mohammed 
Yusuf while in police custody. 157   Reported “massacres, extra-
judicial killings and arrests without trial” in this repression have 
created a rift between the security forces and the communities that 
they are tasked to secure.158  As a result of the heavy handed military 
response to the insurgency, there are reports of a rise in the 
membership of the group from an estimated 4,000 members in 2009 
to between 6,000 and 8,000 in 2014.159 
 
 
 153 Mark D. Kielsgard & Tam Hey Juan Julian, Stopping Terrorism at its Source: 
Conceptual Flaws of the Deterrence-Based Counterterrorism Regime and Committing to a 
Preemptive Causal Model, 26 J. L. & POL’Y 487, 504 (2018). 
 154 See Idris Uwaisu, Experts Say Nigeria Must Change its Strategy to Defeat Boko 
Haram, DW NEWS (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/experts-say-nigeria-
must-change-its-strategy-to-defeat-boko-haram/a-46803622 
[https://perma.cc/DL6K-RQGQ]. 
 155 See id. 
 156 See Kielsgard & Julian, supra note 153, at 487. 
 157  MARC-ANTOINE PÉROUSE DE MONTCLOS, NIGERIA’S INTERMINABLE 
INSURGENCY? ADDRESSING THE BOKO HARAM CRISIS 11 (Sept. 2014), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/2014
0901BokoHaramPerousedeMontclos_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/PK5F-7848]. 
 158 Id. at 4. 
 159 Id. at 15. 
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b. Law Enforcement 
Nigeria’s current counterterrorism law, the Terrorism 
Prevention Act, was enacted in 2011 following the inaugural violent 
episodes of Boko Haram in its second phase.160  This law, amended 
in 2013, is aimed at providing measures for preventing, prohibiting, 
and combating acts of terrorism, recruitment, terrorism financing as 
well as incorporating provisions of the two international 
conventions, the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of 
Terrorism, and the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism, into domestic law.161  The law provides stiff sentences 
of up to life imprisonment if convicted for committing acts of 
terrorism or terrorism financing.162 
The use of the criminal justice system as a counterterrorism 
mechanism has however been largely ineffective, with the Nigerian 
government prosecuting only a handful of members of Boko Haram 
for serious crimes under the Act.163  A majority of those charged 
were accused of professing membership in a terrorist group and 
failing to disclose information that could have been material to 
investigations.164  Many were set free, but only after remaining in 
custody for long periods of time without trial. 165   The trials 
 
 
 160  See Uchechukwu Wilson Nwosu, Anti-terrorism Legislation and Human 
Rights: An Appraisal of the Nigerian Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011, 5 INT’L J. PEACE 
& CONFLICT STUD. 77, 83 (2018). 
 161 Terrorism (Prevention) Act (2011), Explanatory Memorandum (Nigeria). 
 162 Terrorism (Prevention) Act (2011), Cap. (10), § 33 (Nigeria). 
 163 Nigeria: Flawed Trials of Boko Haram Suspects, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 17, 
2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/17/nigeria-flawed-trials-
boko-haram-suspects [https://perma.cc/D7S2-DFGU]. 
 164 Nigeria Convicts 205 Boko Haram Suspects in Mass Trials, REUTERS (Feb. 20, 
2018, 9:54 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security/nigeria-
convicts-205-boko-haram-suspects-in-mass-trials-idUSKCN1G3253 
[https://perma.cc/3E3L-9YM5]. 
 165 See Agence France-Presse, Amnesty Calls on ICC to Fully Probe Boko Haram 
Conflict Atrocities,  (Dec. 10, 2018, 01:42 AM), 
https://www.voanews.com/africa/amnesty-calls-icc-fully-probe-boko-haram-co
nflict-atrocities [https://perma.cc/S44J-82XQ].  
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themselves have been described as flawed and not adhering to the 
basic standards of fair trial and due process.166 
Due to the intensity of the atrocities committed by Boko Haram, 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) has considered whether it 
has jurisdiction to prosecute.  Following communications pursuant 
to article 15 of the Rome Statute,167 the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 
made public the opening of a preliminary examination of the 
situation in Nigeria on November 18, 2010.168  Even though the OTP 
has found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
group has committed crimes against humanity,169 the situation is 
still under preliminary examination to assess whether possible cases 
would be admissible.170 
The opening of a preliminary examination by the ICC and the 
possibility of opening investigations in the situation regarding Boko 
Haram, however, raises questions about the ability of this 
mechanism to deal decisively with the threat posed by an extremist 
group that possesses all the characteristics and has the potential of 
 
 
 166 Nigeria: Flawed Trials of Boko Haram Suspects, supra note 163; see also Press 
Briefing Notes on Azerbaijan, Egypt and Indonesia/ LGBT and Boko Haram Trials 
in Nigeria from Rupert Colville, Rupert Colville, Spokesperson for the U.N. High 
Comm’r for Hum. Rts. (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2
2232&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/TLX2-273Y]. 
 167 See OFF. OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIM. CT., SITUATION IN NIGERIA ARTICLE 
5 REPORT ¶ 4 (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/docs/SAS%20-
%20NGA%20-%20Public%20version%20Article%205%20Report%20-%2005%20Au
gust%202013.PDF [https://perma.cc/YLY8-SUZT]. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. at 6.  But see Nabil M. Orina, A Critique of the International Legal Regime 
Applicable to Terrorism, 2 STRATHMORE L. J. 21, 23 (2016) (arguing that sporadic acts 
of terror may not amount to international crimes). 
 170  Admissibility of cases before the ICC depends on whether there are 
domestic proceedings against those considered to bear responsibility for such 
crimes and that the cases are of sufficient gravity.  See Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court art. 17, Jul. 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S 38544; see also OFF. 
OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIM. CT., REPORT ON PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION 
ACTIVITIES 2018 (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/181205-
rep-otp-PE-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH7W-S85A] (detailing the case against 
Boko Haram under the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011, the Nigerian Armed 
Forces Act of 2004, and the Anti-Torture Act of 2017). 
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transforming into a fully-fledged global jihadi movement.  
However, as evidenced in 2009 when the group’s founding leader 
Mohammed Yusuf was killed, an ICC investigation that would focus 
on the group’s key leaders does not promise to serve as an effective 
deterrent.  In fact, if the current leader, Abubakar Shekau becomes 
subject of such proceedings and is apprehended—which is a 
challenge on its own—a different leader will emerge and take over, 
perhaps Abu Musabo al-Burnawi, who heads a splinter faction, and 
is likely to transform the remainder of Boko Haram into just another 
affiliate of ISIS. 171   Research on Boko Haram’s organizational 
structure172  has indeed suggested an entity with a multi-layered 
hierarchy headed by a Shura council and consisting of many cells.173  
Further, the effectiveness of a criminal justice approach to 
deterrence in the context of a radicalized group is doubtful in any 
event,174 and more so in an international criminal court where the 
focus is on a select few who are considered only the most culpable. 
c. “Operation Safe Corridor”:  De-Radicalization of Former Militants 
Even as the army cracks down on the militants, it has, in 
conjunction with other government agencies, initiated a de-
radicalization program for defectors that is aimed at reintegrating 
them into society. 175   The program, dubbed “Operation Safe 
Corridor,” aims to offer those who surrender basic vocational skills 
 
 
 171 Freedom C. Onuoha, Split in ISIS-Aligned Boko Haram Group, AL JAZEERA 
CTR. FOR STUDS. (Oct. 27, 2016), https://studies.aljazeera.net/ar/node/1490 
[https://perma.cc/M57C-GVUN]. 
 172  Akali Omeni, Boko Haram’s Increasingly Sophisticated Military Threat, 29 
SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 886, 895 (2018). 
 173  Nigeria: Examining Boko Haram, STRATFOR ANALYSIS (July 15, 2014), 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/nigeria-examining-boko-haram 
[https://perma.cc/D7K2-JAMM]. 
 174 See Kielsgard & Julian, supra note 153, at 513. 
 175 Nigeria Boko Haram Militants Offered Olive Branch by Army, BBC NEWS (Apr. 
7, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35989401 
[https://perma.cc/R97V-RZS8]. 
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that would help them to re-integrate into society.176  The initiative 
has seen 151 former Boko Haram members taken through the 
process and handed over to the Borno state government. 177  
However, typically the most radicalized extremists are the least 
likely to be receptive to deterrence.178 
While the efforts to deradicalize and reintegrate the former 
fighters may be key in addressing the economic and social aspects 
of the root causes of the insurgency, this initiative still has to take 
account of the plight of the victims, many of whom may find it 
difficult to accept the former fighters back into society. 179   This 
points to the need for greater emphasis aimed at transitional justice 
to the victims and affected communities.  The challenge with the 
Nigerian approach is that by focusing primarily on de-radicalizing 
returning fighters it seems to be ignoring preemptive efforts to 
prevent radicalization before it reaches terrorist level proportions.  
A holistic approach to de-radicalization would foster inter-religious 
harmony within communities, greater economic and political 
autonomy for Muslim groups in northern Nigeria, due process and 
equitable access to the judiciary, and security forces that act and are 
viewed as protectors of the community in strict adherence to 
internationally recognized human rights.  In short, the causal model 
to counter-terrorism in northern Nigeria is predicated on political 
and social solutions aimed at prevention.  As the Boko Haram 
movement has remained an organization with primarily a domestic 
focus, the solutions can be found in domestic action. 
 
 
 176 Id. 
 177  Ineke Mules & Mohammad Al-Amin, Boko Haram: Nigeria Moves to 
Deradicalize Former Fighters, DW NEWS (Aug. 8, 2019), 
https://www.dw.com/en/boko-haram-nigeria-moves-to-deradicalize-former-fig
hters/a-49950707 [https://perma.cc/D56B-6R8Q]. 
 178 Kielsgard & Julian, supra note 153, at 514. 
 179 Mules & Al-Amin, supra note 177. 
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d. Vigilantism 
Through military efforts, militia groups have emerged in 
support of the national security forces against Boko Haram, which 
have been the main source of information and intelligence for the 
military. 180   The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) has played a 
prominent role in local mobilization of vigilante efforts at the 
grassroots level.181  The CJTF has been instrumental in bridging the 
divide between local communities and security forces especially in 
the face of the brutality suffered by the communities through 
collective punishment. 182   Their local knowledge has been 
instrumental in assisting security forces with the collection of 
intelligence and identification of suspected militants.183 
With sweeping powers to arrest and interrogate, the vigilante 
groups have been accused of perpetuating atrocities on those 
suspected of being Boko Haram members with the acquiescence of, 
and sometimes jointly with, the military and sometimes jointly.184  
Further, even though the CJTF is organized at some levels with the 
assistance of the military,185 the numbers have swollen to the extent 
that they may become a security threat rather than a source of 
 
 
 180  See Chukwuma Al Okoli, War in Nigeria: Self-help Vigilante Groups are 
Reshaping Security Against Boko Haram, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 4, 2017, 7:55 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/war-nigeria-self-help-vigilante-groups-are-reshapi
ng-security-against-boko-646314 [https://perma.cc/9S87-XP7X]; Daniel E. 
Agbiboa, Eyes on the Street: Civilian Joint Task Force and the Surveillance of Boko Haram 
in Northeastern Nigeria, 33 INTEL & NAT’L SEC. 1022, 1025 (2018), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2018.1475892 
[https://perma.cc/UQS9-TBRX]. 
 181 Id. 
 182 INT’L CRISIS GRP., DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD: VIGILANTES IN AFRICAN COUNTER-
INSURGENCIES 17 (Sept. 7, 2017) [hereinafter DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD], 
https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/251-double-edged-sword.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BX72-YALG]. 
 183  Oluwaseun Bamidele, Civilian Joint Task Force’ (CJTF) – A Community 
Security Option: A Comprehensive and Proactive Approach to Counter-Terrorism, 7 J. FOR 
DERADICALIZATION 124, 133 (2016). 
 184 DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD, supra note 182, at 19.  
 185 Id. at 17. 
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security due to the possibility of misuse of their role to perpetuate 
criminality like extortion and usurpation of law enforcement 
powers. 186   Indeed, it is often the case that however successful 
vigilantism is as a counter-insurgency mechanism, it is bound to be 
counterproductive in the long run as it is not easy to demobilize and 
often turns into an insurgency itself.187  Moreover, in this case, the 
vigilante group would have been trained and armed by the same 
government they may someday be fighting.  Reliance on vigilantism 
is a dangerous solution. 
Joint security forces and civilian efforts against Boko Haram 
have also meant that Boko Haram has stepped up retaliatory attacks 
against civilians and communities who are perceived to be 
collaborating with security forces,188  mostly targeting community 
leaders.189  It has been reported that 680 CJTF members were killed 
between 2014 and 2017 in retaliation.190  This situation highlights the 
shortcomings of the traditional approaches to counterinsurgency 
and further widens the rift between those who support government 
security efforts and those who are sympathetic to Boko Haram, often 
providing the affected communities with an impossible choice. 
 
 
 186  See Vanda Felbab-Brown, Nigeria’s Troubling Counterinsurgency Strategy 
Against Boko Haram, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/nigeria/2018-03-30/nigerias-troubling-
counterinsurgency-strategy-against-boko-haram [https://perma.cc/8CXG-
U6M5]; see also Martin Patience, Nigerian Vigilantes Fight Boko Haram One Bullet at a 
Time, BBC NEWS (Sept. 3, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
41097440 [https://perma.cc/GE65-BKSR]. 
 187 DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD, supra note 182, at 26. 
 188 INT’L CRISIS GRP., WATCHMEN OF LAKE CHAD: VIGILANTE GROUPS FIGHTING 
BOKO HARAM 13 (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-
africa/nigeria/244-watchmen-lake-chad-vigilante-groups-fighting-boko-haram 
[https://perma.cc/3EKQ-V2CN]. 
 189 Nigeria: Boko Haram Targeting Schools, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 7, 2012, 5:22 
PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/07/nigeria-boko-haram-targeting-
schools [https://perma.cc/A9ZH-5HXF]. 
 190 Boko Haram Kills 680 Civilian JTF Members in Three Years – Official, PREMIUM 
TIMES (July 10, 2017), 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/236363-boko-haram-kills-
680-civilian-jtf-members-three-years-official.html [https://perma.cc/L52H-RZJ5]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/4
2020] Boko Haram in the Context of Global Jihadism 197 
 
   
 
 
V. PROSPECTS FOR NIGERIA’S COUNTERTERRORISM 
a. Peace Negotiations 
As a matter of principle, states and policy makers have been 
reluctant to negotiate with terrorist groups because doing so would 
legitimize terrorist activities and interests, which are often 
considered irrational and baseless.191   Negotiating with a violent 
entity presents states with a normative challenge that places the state 
in a position where it is seen as accepting that violence is a legitimate 
way of advancing grievances.192  Whereas there is sound reasoning 
behind the “no negotiation” policy, there are equally good reasons 
for a state to engage with a violent entity with the prospect that the 
engagement will lead to a ceasefire and create room for a peaceful 
settlement—especially in a case where a military campaign has 
substantially weakened the state and has grown out of an 
insurgency movement.  Toros identifies three such reasons: 
First, negotiations may eliminate one of the reasons why the 
insurgents may have engaged in violence in the first place 
(lack of a legal outlet to voice their grievances).  Second, they 
may strengthen the faction in the insurgent group that is in 
favour of nonviolent engagement.  Third, they may draw 
insurgent groups down a path of change or transformation 
towards nonviolence.193 
Applying the first point to the Boko Haram insurgency, by 
negotiating with the group, the Nigerian government would be 
acknowledging that the group could have a legitimate grievance 
and hence giving it a non-violent platform to air the grievance.  
Second, as shown in the analysis above, Boko Haram has had 
different factions within its leadership with some that were 
 
 
 191 See Harmonie Toros, ‘We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists!’: Legitimacy and 
Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts, 39 SEC. DIALOGUE 407, 408 (2008). 
 192 Id. at 412. 
 193 Id. at 413. 
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amenable to non-violent political solutions and hence an offer to 
negotiate may appeal to the moderate factions. 194   The third 
argument is premised on the assumption that by appealing to those 
who may hold moderate views within the insurgency, it might 
create a path to a transformation of the group.195  Those within the 
insurgency that would be willing to negotiate might push for change 
of leadership to one that favors non-violence, an important 
consideration in such a leader-centric group. 
Aside from the complexities associated with the decision to 
negotiate, from a policy perspective, there is the question of whether 
such negotiations would be feasible in any case.  There was 
reluctance in the past to engage in negotiations as Boko Haram had 
rejected previous attempts,196 and their demands have not been clear 
cut.197  It has also been contended that the Nigerian government 
lacks enthusiasm to negotiate because Boko Haram doesn’t have 
economic leverage that could have drawn the government to the 
table as MEND did in the Niger Delta.198  Conversely, it is argued 
that the group—in the first phase of its development under 
Mohammed Yusuf—was amenable to negotiating with the 
 
 
 194 Conversely, extremist groups have been known to eliminate those who are 
considered moderates and who would be willing to negotiate with authorities. For 
instance, Mamman Nur, one of the senior Boko Haram leaders, was killed by 
elements within the group for being considered moderate.  See Ruth Maclean & 
Ismail Alfa, Senior Boko Haram Reportedly Killed by Allies, GUARDIAN (Sept. 14, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/14/senior-boko-haram-figure-
reportedly-killed-by-allies [https://perma.cc/X24Y-QCPW]; see also Zenn, supra 
note 63 (stating that Mamman Nur is said to have been in negotiations to end the 
insurgency). 
 195 Toros, supra note 191, at 414. 
 196 See H.R. SUBCOMM. ON COUNTERTERRORISM & INTEL COMM. ON HOMELAND 
SEC., 112TH CONG., REP. ON BOKO HARAM: EMERGING THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND 
22  (Comm. Print 2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-
112HPRT71725/pdf/CPRT-112HPRT71725.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NG5-V8X7]; 
see also Ndahi Marama, ‘Shekau’ Denies Ceasefire Deal with FG in New Video, 
VANGUARD (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/11/shekau-
denies-ceasefire-deal-fg-new-video [https://perma.cc/9XXJ-ZVL2] (describing a 
video of Shekau dismissing government claims about ceasefire talks and 
threatening to kill the man who presented himself as Boko Haram's negotiator). 
 197 See WALKER, supra note 8, at 11. 
 198 PÉROUSE DE MONTCLOS, supra note 157, at 6. 
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government, but the military repression of 2009 eliminated 
moderate voices within the group and gave way to radicals who 
assumed leadership thereafter. 199   Further, as opposed to other 
groups like the insurgents in the Muslim Mindanao region who are 
known to be fighting for independence and have been engaging 
with the Philippines authorities for greater autonomy for the region 
as a compromise to cease the insurgency,200 Boko Haram’s domestic 
agenda to establish a pure Islamic State in the northern region may 
not be feasible.  Yet, the nature of negotiation as such is compromise, 
which may have been possible with the prospect of greater self-
determination with respect to local political, economic, and 
educational issues.  The strength of any extremist movement feeds 
upon the bystander and sympathetic community members who take 
no active role but provide emotional and actual support201 to the 
group.  These members would be more open to compromise and 
would assert pressure for peaceful solutions. 
Indeed, recent negotiation attempts have encountered a few 
problems,202 but have partly succeeded in the release of some of the 
kidnapped girls.203  One practical problem with negotiation is Boko 
Haram’s split into internal factions.204  The fragmentation is not the 
result of conflicting agendas, which remain relatively consistent, but 
 
 
 199 Id. at 11. 
 200 The peace negotiations with the Philippines government have culminated 
in the passing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law in January 2019 creating a path for 
peace in the Mindanao region.  See Mathew Bukit, In Mindanao, BARMM Is Only the 
Beginning, DIPLOMAT (Mar. 12, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/in-
mindanao-barmm-is-only-the-beginning/[https://perma.cc/3NDQ-ZU2Z]; see 
also Philippines Duterte: Martial Law Extended in Mindanao, BBC NEWS (July 22, 2017), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40690589 [https://perma.cc/GK8W-
RC7H]. 
 201 See Kielsgard & Julian, supra note 153, at 502. 
 202 Michael Nwankpa, Dialoguing and Negotiating with Terrorists: Any Prospect 
for Boko Haram?, 9 BEHAV. SCIS. TERRORISM & POL. AGGRESSION 106, 120 (2017). 
 203 Ruth Maclean & Isaac Abrak, Boko Haram Returns More than 100 Schoolgirls 
Kidnapped Last Month, GUARDIAN (Mar. 21, 2018, 08:39 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/21/boko-haram-returns-some-
of-the-girls-it-kidnapped-last-month [https://perma.cc/4EUB-5BV7]. 
 204  See Wisdom O. Iyekekpolo, Boko Haram: Understanding the Context, 37 
THIRD WORLD Q. 2211, 2221 (2016). 
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rather differing views on targeting, tactics, and external links.  The 
addition of external links to negotiations means that pressure would 
be applied by Al-Qaeda or ISIS depending on which faction of Boko 
Haram the authorities are negotiating with.  Under this perspective, 
the feasibility of negotiation depends on the vitality and 
commitment of the group to external links.  The “Al-Qaeda effect” 
portrayed by Boko Haram’s ideological leanings, tactics and targets, 
and external linkages as expounded above reveal Boko Haram as a 
“complexity.”205   Given the existential position of both Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS, Boko Haram would have to precipitate a break from both 
groups in order to negotiate in earnest with the Nigerian 
government or its designee.  This may be unfeasible for splinter 
groups that have broken from Boko Haram, such as ANSUR and 
ISWAP,206 because they are more closely aligned and dependent on 
external links to global jihadism.  Indeed, the ties of Boko Haram to 
international jihadism is better characterized as one of convenience 
perpetrated mostly for mutual propagandizing purposes.207  Boko 
Haram has suffered severe financial turmoil in recent years without 
significant assistance from either Al-Qaeda or ISIS.208 
 
 
 205  Toros explains that the Al-Qaeda “complexity” portends challenges in 
devising workable counterterrorism measures.  Global jihadi movements like Al-
Qaeda have categorically rejected negotiations and depending on the level of 
affiliation, this could complicate any possibility of locally-oriented groups 
negotiating.  However, Toros argues that engaging with locally-oriented groups 
would be a key to weakening global jihadism by emphasising the differences in the 
agenda between such groups and global jihadist movements.  See Toros, supra note 
191, at 417-18. 
 206 Ruth Mclean & Eric Schmitt, ISIS Affiliate in Nigeria Releases a Video Showing 
11 Executions, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/27/world/africa/ISIS-executions-Nigeria.h
tml [https://perma.cc/G946-DP8E]. 
 207  See Freedom Onuoha, Understanding Boko Haram’s Attacks on 
Telecommunication Infrastructure in BOKO HARAM: ANATOMY OF A CRISIS 16, 27 
(Ioannis Mantzikos ed., 2013). 
 208 See YAYA FANUSIE & ALEX ENTZ, CTR. ON SANCTIONS & ILLICIT FIN., BOKO 
HARAM FINANCIAL ASSESSMENT 10 (2017) (providing an overview of Boko Haram’s 
dire financial situation).  
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It is also the case that Boko Haram’s current agenda is not readily 
discernible,209 as it was under Yusuf.  Originally begun to ban on 
Western-style education,210 it then morphed into an adoption of a 
Taliban-like social and political structure.211  As the movement has 
become more dispersed, its leader exercises little control over its 
splintered factions and the specific focus of the organization has 
been lost.212  However, this is also the province of diplomacy with 
an initial goal of hammering out a list of agenda items correlating to 
the expectations of Boko Haram and the Nigerian government.  In 
hindsight, negotiations would have been considerably less complex 
if initiated before Yusuf died.  Thus far, negotiations that have been 
carried out have been for the release of persons who have been 
kidnapped. 213   These negotiations have, thus, been aimed at 
achieving short-term goals and should not be seen as opening any 
prospects for a pervasive settlement of the conflict, 214  but they 
provide a precedent and possibly a channel for communication, 
essential for the beginning of more substantive negotiations.  
Without bona fide negotiation attempts and an agenda that would 
form the basis of structured negotiations, the insurgents might step 
up the kidnappings as a means of sustaining themselves through the 
payment of ransom.215 
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b. Adopting a Causal Approach 
Nigeria’s portrayal of Boko Haram as an Al-Qaeda affiliate 
ignores its national context,216 which is key to understanding and 
addressing the root causes of the insurgency.  Labeling the 
insurgency as global jihad is convenient for the military approach, 
which has been employed so far with varying degrees of success.  
Violent extremism has been associated with underlying societal 
issues where it occurs. 217   These may be summarized as socio-
economic, political, and religious.218  The insurgency in North-East 
Nigeria can be traced to a feeling of marginalization by the majority 
Muslim northern part from the comparatively well to do majority 
Christian south.219  The rise of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria is 
thus attributed to its appeal to unemployed youth from poor 
backgrounds who blame their situation on poor governance and 
corruption.220  On a broader perspective, Nigeria has been plagued 
by runaway corruption and high levels of inequality for many 
years.221  Poverty and unemployment are therefore a big contributor 
 
 
 216 See PATRICK SMITH, NORWEGIAN PEACEBUILDING RES. CTR., DJIHADISME SANS 
FRONTIERS? BOKO HARAM’S REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LINKS 1-3 (2014), 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/166705aa559ad5ab2cad
e4aa65139d92.pdf [https://perma.cc/YD6R-2UPF]. 
 217 See Sam Heller, Commentary, Rightsizing the Transnational Jihadist Threat, 
INT’L CRISIS GRP. (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/rightsizing-
transnational-jihadist-threat [https://perma.cc/CNN8-RCGM]. 
 218 See Adesoji O. Adelaja & Eva Penar, Public Opinion on the Root Causes of 
Terrorism and Objectives of Terrorists: A Boko Haram Case Study, 12 PERSPS. ON 
TERRORISM 35, 35 (2018). 
 219 See Caitriona Dowd & Adam Drury, Marginalisation, Insurgency and Civilian 
Insecurity: Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army, 5 PEACEBUILDING 136, 142 
(2017). 
 220 Eugene Eji, Rethinking Nigeria’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy, INT’L J. INTEL. 
SEC. & PUB. AFFS. 198, 201 (2016). 
 221 See Peter Mbah, Chikodiri Nwangwu & Herbert C. Edeh, Elite Politics and 
the Emergence of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, 2 TRAMES 173, 174 (2017). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss1/4
2020] Boko Haram in the Context of Global Jihadism 203 
 
   
 
 
to radicalization in northern Nigeria. 222   By appealing to the 
dominant religion in the north the insurgents have endeavored to 
justify their insurgency through religious ideology as a way to 
address what ails the region.  A suitable counterterrorism approach 
should therefore focus on addressing socio-economic and political 
concerns in order to create an environment where peace talks can 
succeed. 
Scholars have proposed a causal approach to counterterrorism 
which involves taking proactive steps to prevent communities from 
being radicalized hence curbing terrorist recruitment rather being 
reactionary. 223   These measures, they argue, should take an 
international human rights and international humanitarian 
approach, which would ensure that such communities attain both 
civil and political rights and socio-economic development.224 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When classifying specific terrorist threats, the issues of ideology, 
military operations/targets, and external relations are key to 
understanding the nature of the threat, its international 
pervasiveness, vitality, and assessing effective responses.  Boko 
Haram’s Salafist ideology does not in itself preclude non-violent 
means to achieve their objectives, though many other groups 
steeped in this ideology have resorted to violent means.  Moreover, 
because Boko Haram is leader-centric, a shift away from its current 
leader in favor of a replacement in the image of Mohammed Yusuf 
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could fuel non-violent negotiations and solutions.  This is possible 
because of the lack of strong linkages with other existential terrorist 
groups like ISIS and because the source of Boko Haram’s grievances 
lies in a strictly domestic agenda.  Historically, the group sought 
peaceful methods for advancing its goals and even during its second 
violent phase it continued to largely target local entities as its 
excursions into nearby Chad, Cameroon, and Niger were for 
practical and non-ideological purposes.  Thus, the efficacy of 
negotiation with this group is significantly more likely to succeed 
than with other groups with a more polarized international agenda. 
The issue of applying a causal approach would require peaceful 
and structured negotiations with Boko Haram directed at greater 
autonomy in the north and increased local authority for political, 
religious, and economic issues as well as locally-determined 
education reform.  By applying a causal approach to its 
counterterrorism model, Nigeria could stop the violence as Boko 
Haram presents a feasible candidate for potentially non-violent 
resolutions to the conflict in northern Nigeria. 
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